01423nam a22001337a 4500100002100000245008000021260005300101300000900154520100400163650003001167856007201197942000701269999001301276  aFjeldstad, O. H.  aTaxation, Coercion and Donors: Local Government Tax Enforcement in Tanzania  aUnited KingdombCambridge University Pressc2001  a18p.  aThis paper presents three propositions about tax collection by local authorities in Tanzania. First, revenue performance depends on the degree of coercion involved in tax enforcement. Reciprocity does not seem to be an inherent component of the state society relationship in connection with local government taxation. Second, the extent of coercion depends on the bargaining powers of the stakeholders involved in the tax enforcement process. In particular, coercive tax enforcement is facilitated when the `bargaining powers' with respect to tax collection favour the council administration, and the elected councillors have no direct influence on collection. Third, the presence of donors in a local authority may be crucial by changing the `balance of power' in favour of the council administration, with implications for accountability, responsiveness and democratic development. These results may explain why widespread differences in revenue performance between local authorities are observed.  aTax Avoidance and Evasion  uiffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/Taxation, coercion and donors.pdf  cCF  c658d658