<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<mods xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3" version="3.1" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/mods/v3 http://www.loc.gov/standards/mods/v3/mods-3-1.xsd">
  <titleInfo>
    <title>Domestic Resource Mobilization In West Africa: Missed Oppotunities</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Dalberg</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">Senegal</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <publisher>Open Society Initiative for West Africa</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2015</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <physicalDescription>
    <extent>69p.</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>Transfer mispricing occurs when multinational companies take advantage of their organisational structure to shift profit out of higher-tax jurisdiction to lower-tax jurisdiction, primarily by means of under-invoicing or over-invoicing. Unlike abusive transfer pricing which erodes the tax base as a result of fraudulent manipulation of prices of intragroup transactions, tax incentives grant targeted tax deductions, credits, exclusions or exemptions to specific tax payer groups, investment expenditures, or investment returns.</abstract>
  <subject>
    <topic>Tax, Transfer Mispricing, Capital Flight, West Africa</topic>
  </subject>
  <identifier type="uri">iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/http___www.osiwa.org_wp-content_uploads_2015_05_domestic-resource-english.pdf</identifier>
  <location>
    <url>iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/http___www.osiwa.org_wp-content_uploads_2015_05_domestic-resource-english.pdf</url>
  </location>
  <recordInfo/>
</mods>
