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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Corruption in Developing Countries</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart> Olken, B. A. and Pande, R.</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">Harvard</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <publisher>Harvard University</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2011</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <physicalDescription>
    <extent>48p.</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists’ ability to measure corruption. This, in turn, has led to a new generation of well-identified, micro-economic studies. Reviewing the evidence on corruption in developing countries these recent advances,they focused on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption. Robust evidence  found was that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory, but also that effects of anti-corruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate
strategies to pursue rents.</abstract>
  <subject>
    <topic>Corruption</topic>
  </subject>
  <identifier type="uri">iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/Corruption in Developing Countries.pdf</identifier>
  <location>
    <url>iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/Corruption in Developing Countries.pdf</url>
  </location>
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