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  xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"><dc:Title>Corruption in Developing Countries</dc:Title>
<dc:Creator>Olken, B. A. and Pande, R.</dc:Creator>
<dc:Subject>Corruption</dc:Subject>
<dc:Description>Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists’ ability to measure corruption. This, in turn, has led to a new generation of well-identified, micro-economic studies. Reviewing the evidence on corruption in developing countries these recent advances,they focused on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption. Robust evidence  found was that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory, but also that effects of anti-corruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate
strategies to pursue rents.</dc:Description>
<dc:Publisher>Harvard Harvard University</dc:Publisher>
<dc:Date>2011</dc:Date>
<dc:Date>2011</dc:Date>
<dc:Type>Text</dc:Type>
<dc:Format>48p.</dc:Format>
<dc:Identifier>iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/Corruption in Developing Countries.pdf</dc:Identifier>

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