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  <titleInfo>
    <title>Illicit Financial Flows and Political Institutions in Kenya</title>
  </titleInfo>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Letete, E.</namePart>
    <role>
      <roleTerm authority="marcrelator" type="text">creator</roleTerm>
    </role>
  </name>
  <name type="personal">
    <namePart>Sarr, M.</namePart>
  </name>
  <typeOfResource>text</typeOfResource>
  <originInfo>
    <place>
      <placeTerm type="text">Côte d’Ivoire</placeTerm>
    </place>
    <publisher>African Development Bank Group</publisher>
    <dateIssued>2017</dateIssued>
    <issuance>monographic</issuance>
  </originInfo>
  <physicalDescription>
    <extent>32p.</extent>
  </physicalDescription>
  <abstract>This paper, published by African Development Bank Group explores a political economy perspective as an alternative explanation to the illicit financial outflows in Kenya. Evidence from the institutional indices found that increased arbitrary executive powers are positively associated with illicit financial outflows. That is, in the Kenyan context, prevailing weaknesses in the political institutions do matter for illicit financial flows (rent extraction). This finding is robust to the constraints on the executive from Polity IV Indicators as an alternative indicator of institutions.</abstract>
  <subject>
    <topic>Illicit Wealth</topic>
  </subject>
  <identifier type="uri">iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_Political_Institutions_in_Kenya__.pdf</identifier>
  <location>
    <url>iffoadatabase.trustafrica.org/iff/Illicit_Financial_Flows_and_Political_Institutions_in_Kenya__.pdf</url>
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